Armenia Must Not Allow Azerbaijan to Monopolize Ties with Israel

Build independent Armenian access

The objective should be independent Armenian access, credibility and influence. Armenia cannot prevent Azerbaijan from maintaining close relations with Israel, nor should it expect those relations to disappear. It can ensure that Israeli institutions and Jewish organizations hear Armenia’s positions directly, understand its security concerns and have practical reasons to develop their own relationships with Yerevan.

Recent developments make this task more urgent.

A deepening defence and diplomatic relationship

On 19 October 2026, Elbit Systems announced a $235 million contract to supply EXTRA-MR rockets and PULS rocket artillery systems to a European customer over three years. Globes, citing sources, identified that customer as Azerbaijan. The distinction matters: the contract announcement is public, while Azerbaijan’s identity as the purchaser rests on the newspaper’s reporting. An announced procurement also does not establish that the equipment has already been delivered or deployed.

Earlier in October, reporting described the establishment of Azerbaijani rifle production in cooperation with Israel’s Ari Arms. This points toward a relationship extending beyond purchases to domestic manufacturing and industrial cooperation. Publicly available information does not establish the plant’s sustained output, production capacity or share of locally manufactured components. Separately, Israel Aerospace Industries used its ADEX 2026 presentation to emphasize technology transfer and local industrial development alongside its defence systems. An exhibition offer should not be confused with a signed procurement contract.

These developments build on a substantial existing relationship. SIPRI estimated that Israel supplied 69 percent of Azerbaijan’s major arms imports in 2016–2020. This is a historical measure of arms transfers, not the Israeli share of Azerbaijan’s current arsenal. It nevertheless demonstrates why Armenian concerns about this partnership are substantive.

The diplomatic relationship is also receiving attention at the highest level. On 14 October, President Isaac Herzog met President Ilham Aliyev in Baku during the CICA summit. Israel’s presidential office described their discussion as addressing deeper strategic relations. The announced visit programme also included a meeting with Azerbaijan’s Jewish community leaders. These contacts connect interstate diplomacy with community relationships and public messaging.

The lesson of the Ankara–Baku disagreement

The October confrontation between Azerbaijan and Türkiye illustrates Baku’s determination to preserve room for independent decisions. On 13 October, Azerbaijan’s governing party criticized Turkish political figures over the school-headscarf dispute and defended Azerbaijan’s relations with Israel. Two days later, Hakan Fidan acknowledged differences in approach while emphasizing the strength of Turkish–Azerbaijani relations. The evidence supports a significant disagreement within a continuing alliance; it does not establish a strategic rupture.

The lesson for Armenia is that close partnerships do not require identical positions on every issue. Yerevan should develop relations with Israel on their own merits while continuing normalization with Türkiye and maintaining essential relations with Iran. A policy dependent on lasting hostility between Ankara and Baku would be fragile.

Engage distinct institutions directly

Azerbaijan’s outreach also extends beyond the Israeli state. On 9 February 2026, Aliyev received a delegation of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations. Azerbaijan’s official account explicitly connected this cooperation with its relations with the United States and Israel. That account reflects Baku’s presentation of the meeting, but the meeting itself demonstrates sustained institutional access. It does not prove control over those organizations or their policy positions.

Armenia should therefore avoid treating a “Jewish lobby” as a single institution with one position. Jewish advocacy, religious, civic and philanthropic organizations have different mandates and constituencies. Their relationships with Israel also differ. Effective diplomacy requires identifying particular institutions, understanding their priorities and establishing direct dialogue.

Nor is Armenia starting from nothing. The American Jewish Committee publicly supported the 2019 congressional Armenian Genocide resolution, and its then-chief executive reiterated the importance of recognition in 2021. These examples show that Azerbaijan does not possess an exclusive claim on Jewish institutional relationships. Armenia should build on existing cooperation rather than describe every potential partner as already belonging to Baku.

Five practical priorities for Armenia

Armenia’s response should have five practical priorities.

First, establish a regular political and security dialogue with Israel. The November 2025 bilateral consultations identified technology, healthcare, agriculture and tourism as areas for cooperation. Armenia should develop a dated follow-up programme and a dedicated channel for discussing arms transfers and regional security. It should seek specific explanations and safeguards concerning systems that could be used against Armenian territory or civilians. These requests should be documented and pursued consistently, without assuming that dialogue will automatically change Israeli export policy.

Second, create practical reasons for cooperation. Armenia should propose a small number of feasible projects in water management, agricultural technology, medical research and civilian innovation. Each should have an institutional partner, a budget and a measurable result. Commercial and academic relationships can give bilateral ties substance beyond periodic diplomatic visits.

Third, maintain direct engagement with Jewish organizations. Armenian diplomatic missions and diaspora institutions should coordinate regular briefings and reciprocal visits. Discussions should cover Armenian sovereignty, regional peace, displaced Armenians’ needs, cultural heritage and the consequences of military escalation. Cooperation on genocide education and opposition to antisemitism should be principled and sustained, rather than presented as a transaction for political support.

Fourth, place the Armenian community and heritage in Jerusalem on the bilateral agenda. Armenia should pursue practical arrangements concerning community security, religious access and the protection of Armenian cultural and institutional interests, in consultation with the Armenian Patriarchate and local representatives. Their needs deserve direct attention within the relationship.

Fifth, preserve Armenia’s independent regional policy. Engagement with Israel should not require participation in confrontation with Iran or abandonment of support for Palestinian statehood and civilian protection. Armenia recognized Palestine in June 2024. It should explain that constructive relations with Israel, Palestinian rights and secure relations with Iran belong within a consistent policy of sovereignty and peaceful coexistence.

A six-month programme with measurable results

For the next six months, Armenia should assign a senior coordinator, seek a new round of bilateral consultations, prepare a documented security agenda and launch two feasible civilian cooperation projects. Its embassies should arrange sustained discussions with a range of Jewish organizations, including institutions with existing Armenian relationships.

Success should be measured through functioning channels, substantive responses to Armenian concerns, reciprocal visits and projects that continue beyond their announcement. A meeting or photograph is useful only if it creates a relationship capable of handling disagreement.

At Hayk’s Arrow Armenian Strategic Center, we believe Armenia must represent its own interests wherever consequential decisions are made. Azerbaijan’s relationship with Israel is a reason for more capable Armenian diplomacy. Armenia should build enough independent access and cooperation that its security, sovereignty and regional role cannot be understood solely through Baku’s account.